Facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) is a proxy for testosterone levels and has been linked to aggressive behavior and increased risk tolerance. This study is the first to examine the relationship between a proxy for CEO testosterone levels and firm financial policies. Using data hand-collected from images of 968 male CEOs of S&P 500 firms, I find that CEO facial width is positively correlated with leverage and negatively correlated with cash holdings during the 2002-2013 period. The relationship between CEO fWHR and financial policies is also observed for CEOs who go on to attain longer tenures with their firms, as well as when post-turnover firm-year observations are removed from the sample. Overall, it appears that CEO testosterone levels have a significant impact on corporate financial management decisions, as higher testosterone levels may induce CEOs to pursue more aggressive financial policies.
Introduction
A growing body of literature indicates that certain observable CEO characteristics, including age 1 , education 2 , gender 3 , overconfidence 4 , military service 5 , and early-life experiences 6 , can have substantial impacts on corporate finance policies. In an effort to determine whether CEOs'
testosterone levels might play a role in determining financial management decisions, I relate CEO facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) to firm financial policies, since facial width has been shown to be a proxy for testosterone levels (Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett, and Penke, 2013) . As the majority of studies on the subject have concluded that high testosterone levels are associated with increased risk tolerance and aggression, I expect that, if testosterone levels affect a CEO's managerial preferences, greater CEO facial width will be associated with more aggressive firm financial policies.
Because obtaining saliva samples from or measuring digit lengths (another proxy for testosterone levels) of a large number of CEOs would be highly impractical, one significant advantage of examining CEO facial width instead is that it provides a somewhat readily available and easily observable insight into a CEO's testosterone levels. To test the hypothesis that higher CEO fWHR will be associated with more aggressive firm financial policies, I collect images of 968 male CEOS of S&P 500 firms and measure fWHR for each. I then relate the fWHR measurements to leverage, cash holdings, investment, and profitability in their respective firms.
While I do not find evidence that CEO fWHR is associated with differences in investment decisions, nor does it appear that CEO testosterone levels are correlated with firm profitability, I
do find strong evidence that CEO fWHR is associated with more aggressive financial policies.
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While the observed relationship between CEO fWHR and financial policies might reflect the effect of testosterone levels on CEOs' managerial preferences, it is also possible that highfWHR, high-testosterone CEOs might naturally sort into firms that already have aggressive financial policies. After examining financial characteristics of firms prior to hiring CEOs for which fWHR data has been collected, I find little evidence to support the latter hypothesis. To examine the former possibility, that the relationship between CEO fWHR and financial policies reflects managerial preferences, I construct two subsamples where CEOs might have greater influence on the financial policies of their firms. The first subsample is created by removing the first two years of firm-year observations following a new CEO being hired. It is expected that the financial characteristics of a firm will more accurately represent a CEO's managerial preferences after the third year than during earlier parts of his or her tenure since CEOs will have had ample time to implement their desired financial policies by their third year. A second subsample is comprised of "long-term" CEOs, which I classify as CEOs who go onto achieve tenures of at least eight years with their firms. These long-term CEOs are likely to be more influential figures in their firms than shorter-tenured CEOs, and the financial policies of the firms they manage should provide a more accurate representation of their managerial preferences.
In both of these subsamples, the relationships between CEO fWHR and financial policies
are consistent with what is observed in the full sample. High facial width among these CEOs is again correlated with higher leverage and lower cash holdings, although the effect of CEO fWHR on leverage choice is attenuated in long-term CEOs. The relationship between CEO fWHR and firm cash holdings is increased among CEOs with greater influence. Given that the relationship between fWHR and financial policies holds among more influential CEOs, and considering that CEOs do not appear to sort into financially aggressive or conservative firms according to fWHR, it appears that higher testosterone levels may induce CEOs to pursue more aggressive financial policies.
This paper contributes to the area of corporate finance literature which shows that observable CEO characteristics can have a significant influence on financial management decisions. Additionally, these findings provide further support for the broader notion that higher testosterone levels are associated with greater risk taking behavior, even in the boardrooms of large S&P 500 firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data collection procedure, variable definitions, and summary statistics. Section 4 presents results regarding the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm financial outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
Facial Width and Testosterone
Several studies have investigated the relationship between facial appearance and testosterone levels. Penton-Voak and Chen (2004) find that male subjects with higher testosterone levels were judged to have more masculine-looking faces than low testosterone men. Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett, and Penke (2013) show that males with greater facial width tend to have higher testosterone levels. Male subjects with high fWHR had higher baseline testosterone levels, as well as larger testosterone reactions following exposure to potential mating opportunities at a speed-dating event. This study provides strong evidence that testosterone could explain links documented between fWHR and certain behavioral traits (suggested by Carré and McCormick, 2008) .
The relationship between facial width and aggressive behavior has been studied in several papers. Carré and McCormick (2008) document a positive relationship between fWHR and penalty minutes in hockey players at both the varsity and professional levels, although Deaner, Goetz, Shattuck, and Schnotala (2012) argue that body weight, rather than fWHR, better predicts aggression in hockey players. Carré, McCormick, and Mondloch (2009) find that fWHR is linked to both perceived and actual aggression. In the study, onlookers viewed photographs of male subjects with neutral facial expressions. Observers were asked to gauge each subject's propensity for aggression based on his photograph, and the subjects were tested separately for their actual propensity for aggression. Both the onlookers' perceptions of aggression and the actual aggressive tendencies of the photographed subjects were positively correlated with the subjects' fWHR. Özener (2012) , however, finds no relationship between fWHR and self-reported aggression in a sample of Turkish university students. Goetz, Shattuck, Miller, Campbell, Lozoya, Weisfeld, and Carré (2014) find that the relationship between fWHR and aggression is more robust amongst males of lower social status.
Facial width has been linked to a number of antisocial behavioral traits. Stirrat and Perrett (2010) find that facial width is associated with both perceived trustworthiness as well as an actual propensity to exploit the trust of others for personal financial gain. Haselhuhn and Wong (2012) link high fWHR with feelings of power, as well as cheating and deceptive behavior. Hehman, Leitner, Deegan, and Gaertner (2013) report that fWHR is associated with a greater willingness to explicitly endorse racially prejudiced views, while observers accurately judged wider-faced men as being more likely to have racist attitudes. Valentine, Li, Penke, and Perrett (2014) found that high fWHR males were more likely to be perceived as dominant, as well as more attractive to women for short-term (but not long-term) relationships. The study also found that high fWHR males were more likely to experience feelings of dominance, concluding that facial width is a physical marker of dominance in men.
Facial width has also been linked to positive behavioral traits and outcomes. Lewis, Lefevre, and Bates (2012) document a positive relationship between fWHR and achievementstriving in a sample of former US presidents, while Stirrat and Perrett (2012) show that males
with greater facial width demonstrate greater self-sacrifice in order to promote cooperation amongst their teammates in group competitions. Tsujimura and Banissy (2013) find a positive association between fWHR and home run hitting over a two-year period in a sample of Japanese professional baseball players. Facial width in CEOs has been previously examined by Wong, Ormistion, and Haselhuhn (2011) , who show that fWHR in male CEOs is positively related to firm performance in firms classified as having cognitively simple leadership teams.
Testosterone levels have also been directly linked to a number of human behaviors and characteristics, including interpersonal dominance and aggression (Archer, 2006; Mazur and Booth, 1998; Stanton and Schultheiss, 2009) , substance abuse, sexual promiscuity, and violence (Mazur, 1995; Dabbs, Frady, Carr, and Besch, 1987) , and occupational status (Dabbs, Alford, and Fielden, 1998) . In addition, the relationship between testosterone and risk tolerance has been studied extensively. Most studies of this relationship, but not all, have found that testosterone levels are positively correlated with risk tolerance and risk-taking behavior. Apicella, Dreber, Campbell, Gray, Hoffman, and Little (2008) find that both salivary testosterone levels and facial masculinity were positively associated with risk-taking behavior in an investment game with actual monetary payoffs. Stanton, Liening, and Schultheiss (2011) find that salivary testosterone levels explained differences in decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task (see Bechara et al., 1994) , as higher testosterone levels were associated with greater risk taking among both male and female test subjects. Stanton, O'Dhaniel, McLaurin, Kuhn, LaBar, Platt, and Huettel (2011) observed a U-shaped, nonlinear relationship between salivary testosterone levels and risk A.M. over the course of an eight-day study, finding that traders subsequently earned higher profits on days where their morning testosterone levels were high. The authors suggest that this short-term trading success observed in the study can be attributed to testosterone's effects on search persistence (Andrew and Rogers, 1972) , risk tolerance, and novelty-seeking behavior (Boissy and Bouissou, 1994; Hermans, Putnam, Baas, Koppeschaar, and van Honk, 2006) , but caution that permanently elevated testosterone levels could lead to a cycle of increasing and potentially irrational risk taking, potentially resulting in long-term losses.
Another commonly used proxy for testosterone levels is the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger, referred to as the 2D:4D ratio. The 2D:4D ratio is a sexually dimorphic trait, usually below one for men and approximately equal to one for women, and is believed to be a proxy for prenatal androgen exposure, with lower ratios indicating higher prenatal androgen exposure (Manning, Scutt, Wilson, and Lewis-Jones, 1998) . Manning et al. (1998) also show that 2D:4D is negatively correlated with adult testosterone levels and positively correlated with adult oestrogen levels in both men and women. 2D:4D has been directly linked to a number of behaviors and traits commonly attributed to testosterone, such as athletic ability (Manning and Hill, 2009; Manning and Taylor, 2001) , aggression (Bailey and Hurd, 2005) , and sensation seeking (Fink, Neave, Laughton, and Manning, 2006) . Additionally, 2D:4D has been shown to correlate with fWHR, as men with lower 2D:4D tend to have higher facial width (Fink, Grammer, Mittroecker, Gunz, Schaefer, Bookstein, and Manning, 2005 Apicella et al. (2008) find no relationship between 2D:4D and risk tolerance, but Stenstrom and Saad (2011) note that this could be due to the confounding effects of racial differences in digit length ratios (Manning, Churchill, and Peters, 2007; Manning and Fink, 2008; Stewart, Bundred, and Trivers, 2004 
Data
To examine the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm financial policies, I
constructed a manager-firm matched panel data set that spans from 2002 to 2013. To be included in the sample, a firm must have been listed in the S&P 500 during at least 3 years between 2002
and 2013 and must be incorporated in the United States. Due to regulatory constraints, I exclude firms with SIC codes within the ranges of 4900-4999 (regulated utilities) and 6000-6999
(financial firms). The final data set contains 512 firms and 4,837 firm-year observations.
Next, CEOs of each firm were identified on an annual basis using the Execucomp database, which also provides the full name, gender, and age of each executive. Following previous studies relating fWHR to behavioral characteristics (Carre and McCormick, 2008; Carre et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2011; LeFerve et al., 2013) , the sample was restricted to male subjects, resulting in the exclusion of 29 female CEOs.
Images of each CEO were obtained through Google Image searches and selected in accordance with Carre and McCormick's (2008) guidelines (subject facing forward, head not tilted). Most photos came from company websites or news articles which clearly and directly identified each CEO, and I was careful to ensure that all photos correctly identified their intended subjects when photos were obtained from other sources. I was unable to find satisfactory photos for 11 CEOs that would have otherwise been included in the sample. Measurements for each CEO's fWHR were obtained by placing their images in Adobe InDesign and using the rectangle tool to measure the distance between the upper lip and brow (facial height) and between the left and right zygion (facial width; Weston, Friday, and Lio, 2007) . The final data set includes fWHR measurements for 968 CEOs. Table 1 provides distribution statistics for the fWHR measure of the CEOs analyzed in this study, as well as statistics regarding fWHR of male subjects provided in several other studies of facial width and behavior. It is interesting to note that CEOs tend to have facial widths greater than graduate and undergraduate students, but lower than U.S. Presidents, which suggests that men in more powerful positions tend to have higher testosterone levels.
Annual firm accounting data was obtained from Compustat. To test for a link between CEO fWHR and firm leverage, I examine both a book-based and a market-based measure of firm leverage. Book leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets (at), and market leverage is long-term debt scaled by market value, where long-term debt is calculated as the sum of total long-term debt (dltt) and debt in current liabilities (dlc), and market value is long-term debt plus the product of the number of common shares outstanding (csho) and the share price at the close of the fiscal year (prcc_f). minus current liabilities (lct). Controls for R&D expenditures, depreciation (dp), and asset tangibility (ppegt/at) are also employed.
In addition, industry-adjusted measures are calculated for all leverage, cash holdings, investment, and firm performance variables. For each variable, I calculate the median industryannual value using Fama-French 12 industry classifications, and then subtract the appropriate industry-annual median from the corresponding firm-year measure. Industry-annual medians, rather than means, are used for industry-adjusted measures due to wide variability in financial characteristics and prevalence of outliers among U.S. Compustat firms. Table 2 reports summary statistics for sample and industry firms. In terms of medians, firms for which CEO fWHR data is available tend to have higher leverage and profitability, lower cash holdings, and more assets relative to U.S. Compustat firms from which industry-adjusted measures are derived. Since all firms for which CEO fWHR data was collected were listed on the S&P 500 for at least a portion of the sample period, it is unsurprising that these firms tend to be larger and more profitable than their industry counterparts. Larger firms tend to have higher leverage and lower cash holdings, as shown in multivariate regressions later in the paper, which might explain the observed differences between sample and industry firms in these regards.
CEO fWHR and firm outcomes
The goal of this paper is to determine if CEO testosterone levels, proxied by facial width, are related to firm financial policies. I expect that, if CEO facial width is correlated with financial policies, high-fWHR will tend to pursue more aggressive financial policies. To begin, CEOs in the sample are sorted from lowest fWHR to highest and placed into two groups: one with CEOs whose fWHR is at or above the median value (high-fWHR), and another for CEOs with belowmedian facial width (low-fWHR). Several CEO characteristics that have been examined in the literature, such as overconfidence, gender, and military experience, are binary in nature and, as such, lend themselves naturally to discrete grouping (male CEOs vs. female CEOs, for example).
Although the fWHR measure employed in this study is continuous rather than binary, one advantage for placing CEOs into two groups as previously described is that it provides a simple measurement of the economic magnitude of the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm financial outcomes. For example, Table 3a shows that market leverage in firms managed by highfWHR CEOs is .0216 higher than in firms managed by low-fWHR CEOs, an increase of 9.1%
relative to the unconditional sample mean. This statistic, however, does not account for firm characteristics, such as size and profitability, or industry and year trends, though I do include measures that adjust for industry-annual trends within this testing framework. Additionally, it is possible that two CEOs with very different management styles might not differ greatly in their fWHR measurements. Nonetheless, the two CEOs would be placed into separate groups if their respective fWHR measurements fell on opposite sides of the sample median. In this case, simply comparing means between the two groups might overstate or incorrectly represent the actual relationship between CEO fWHR and financial policy. A correlation statistic is provided to verify that the difference in means is consistent with a linear relationship between the continuous measure of CEO fWHR and financial policy, and not simply a product of outlying observations within the two groups. Finally, the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm outcomes is analyzed using multivariate regressions. All of the regressions contain industry and year dummies. Standard errors in these regressions are clustered at the firm level, which in some instances results in large decreases in statistical significance of regression coefficients due to high within-firm correlations of several financial policy measures. It should also be noted that the regressions do not contain firm-level fixed effects, and, therefore, any results cannot be considered evidence that CEO fWHR explains difference in financial policies within firms.
Regressions including firm fixed effects, the results of which are not reported in this paper, indicate that CEO fWHR does not reliably explain within-firm differences in financial management for CEOs in this sample. It may simply be the case that differences in testosterone levels do not cause CEOs within the same firm to pursue different financial policies. However, it may be that statistically significant within-firm effects are not found due in part to characteristics of the sample. For example, the maximum number of annual observations for each firm (12) is somewhat small compared to other papers that study the effects of CEO characteristics on firm financial policies. Photos are generally more difficult to obtain for CEOs whose tenures occurred further into the past, which contributes to the somewhat short horizon used in this study. For firms with no CEO turnover during the sample period, the inclusion of firm fixed effects will result in no observed relationship between CEO fWHR and financial policies, since CEO fWHR in that case would also be a firm fixed effect. Too much turnover within a firm could also be problematic if CEOs do not quickly "make their mark" on the firm's financial management. The ideal case to test the within-firm effects of CEO fWHR on financial outcomes would be an instance in which a firm had two CEOs during the sample period, each having a six firm-year observations as CEO and having sizeable differences in their fWHR measurements. Although some firms in the sample have ideal or nearly-ideal distributions of firm-years between CEOs with substantially different facial widths, many do not.
In cases where a relationship is observed between CEO fWHR and financial management decisions, it is important to examine whether the relationship is a result of managerial influence or a remnant of pre-existing firm characteristics. For instance, it may be that the previously mentioned positive relationship between firm leverage and CEO fWHR could be a result of highfWHR executives sorting into high-leverage firms. It is possible that financially aggressive firms tend to select high-testosterone managers that will favor aggressive financial policies already in place, which might partially explain any observed relationships between CEO fWHR and certain financial policies. Several tests are conducted to determine whether managerial influence is responsible for the correlation between CEO fWHR and financial policies. Specifically, all previously outlined testing procedures are performed on two subsamples of CEOs. One subsample consists of CEOs who managed their firms for eight years or longer. These "longterm" CEOs might be expected to wield greater influence over the financial management of their firms, and, as such, the observed financial policies of their firms should reflect true managerial intent to a greater extent than the financial policies of managers with shorter tenures. A second subsample is created by eliminating firm-year observations that occur during the first two years following a CEO turnover event. The elimination of these post-transition years is intended to exclude observaions where a firm's financial policies may still be, to some extent, a remnant of the previous CEO's managerial influence and not entirely attributable to the influence of the new CEO. By the third year of a CEO's tenure, a firm's financial policies should provide a more accurate representation of its CEO's managerial preferences than in observations immediately following turnover. Compared to those observed within the full sample, correlations between CEO fWHR and financial outcomes in these subsamples should be considered stronger evidence that the relationship is due to actual managerial influence, as opposed to the sorting of CEOs into firms with pre-existing financial characteristics.
These tests, however, do not directly rule out the possibility that high-fWHR managers might sort into already aggressive firms, which could explain the observed relationship between CEO fWHR and financial outcomes. To address this possibility, I examine firms' financial policies in the two years before hiring new CEOs and find no evidence of a relationship between pre-existing firm financial characteristics and fWHR of newly-hired CEOs. Thus, it appears that high-fWHR CEOs do not necessarily sort into aggressive firms.
CEO fWHR and Firm Leverage:
A univariate analysis of the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage is presented Table 3a . I expect that, if CEO testosterone levels affect leverage choice, a positive relationship between CEO facial width and firm leverage will be observed. Panel A of Table 3a relates book and market leverage to CEO facial width for the full sample of CEOs. In firms managed by high-fWHR CEOs, book leverage is .0159 higher than in firms managed by lowfWHR managers, which represents an increase of 6.7% relative to the unconditional mean. For market leverage, the difference between high-and low-fWHR groups is .0216, an increase of 10.9% relative to the unconditional mean. After adjusting for industry-annual trends, the differences between fWHR groups increase for both book and market leverage. Firms managed by high-fWHR CEOs have industry-adjusted book leverage .0215 greater than those with lowfWHR CEOs, an increase of 9.1% relative to the unconditional mean for book leverage. The difference in industry-adjusted market leverage between fWHR groups (high minus low) is .027, which represents an increase of 13.6% relative to the unconditional mean. The correlation coefficients are also consistent with a positive relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage, with a stronger correlations observed for market leverage than for book leverage and for industry-adjusted rather than unadjusted measures.
To examine the extent to which the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage observed in the full sample might be a product of actual managerial influence, the relationship between leverage and CEO fWHR is further examined in two subsamples. Panel B of Table 3a reexamines the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage for observations in which the CEO is in at least the third year of his tenure with the firm. For this subsample, the difference in leverage between high-and low-fWHR CEO groups remains positive for all four measures of firm leverage, though the magnitude of the difference is smaller in each case. This implies that high-and low-fWHR CEOs differ in their leverage choices to a greater extent early in their tenures than later, which could suggest that some of the effect might be a result of high-fWHR
CEOs sorting into already highly-leveraged firms, though I find no direct evidence to support this notion. It could also be the case that some CEOs who adopt extreme leverage policies may not last long in their positions, but that possibility is not directly examined in this study. Although the difference in means between groups is smaller across all measures of firm leverage when excluding CEOs' first two years at their firms, the correlation coefficients are slightly larger for all four measures. As is the case in the full sample, correlations between CEO fWHR and leverage are stronger for market leverage than for book leverage and for industry-adjusted measures than for unadjusted measures in this subsample.
I also consider the possibility that longer-tenured CEOs may have greater influence over firm policies than less-experienced managers. In the subsample of "long-term" CEOs (8+ years as CEO), I find that firms managed by high-fWHR CEOs have higher leverage, both in terms of book and market leverage and for industry-adjusted as well as unadjusted measures. The magnitude of the differences in leverage policies between high-and low-fWHR CEOs reported in Table 3a are generally smaller in the long-term subsample than in other samples, though the correlations between leverage and CEO fWHR in the long-term sample are comparable in magnitude to those seen in the full sample.
Regression results for the effect of CEO fWHR on firm leverage are found in Table 3b .
Panel A reports results for the full sample of CEOs. Regressions in columns 1 and 4 contain only regressors for CEO fWHR along with industry and year dummies, with book leverage and market leverage as the dependent variables, respectively. In column 1, the coefficient of .0645, statistically significant at the 10% level, indicates a positive effect of CEO fWHR on book leverage. Columns 2 and 5 add controls for firm size, while columns 3 and 6 add firm-level controls for profitability, asset tangibility, and depreciation. Coefficients for CEO fWHR in columns 2 and 3 indicate a positive effect of CEO fWHR on book leverage, but the coefficient is not statistically significant in either model. Market leverage is the dependent variable in columns 4-6. In column 4, the coefficient for CEO fWHR is .0815 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Including regressors for firm size in column 5 and additional firm-year financial characteristics in column 6 result in a slight decrease in the magnitude of the CEO fWHR coefficient (.0744 and .0534, respectively), but both are statistically significant at the 10% level.
Panels B and C examine the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage for two subsamples. In panel B, the effect of CEO fWHR on book leverage from managers in at least their third year as CEO of their firms is found to be positive but not statistically significant across all specifications. For market leverage, the CEO fWHR coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in columns 4 and 5, but is not found to be statistically significant in column 6 when additional firm-year controls are included (t=1.62). Panel C presents results of regressions of CEO fWHR on firm leverage for long-term CEOs (tenure at least 8 years). For long-term CEOs, the coefficients for CEO fWHR in all specifications are positive but not statistically significant.
Overall, the results indicate that higher CEO fWHR is generally associated with greater firm leverage. This result persists after controlling for industry and year effects and firm-year financial characteristics, as well as clustering of observations within firms. The effect appears to be stronger for market leverage than for book leverage. These results do not suggest, however, that CEO fWHR plays a role in explaining differences in leverage choices between managers within the same firms, but rather CEO fWHR plays a role in predicting differences in leverage between firms. Though the possibility that highly leverage firms tend to hire CEOs with greater fWHR cannot be ruled out entirely, which would attribute the observed differences in leverage to hiring decisions instead of (or in addition to) CEO influence, it does appear that leverage choices are likely consistent with managerial preferences, as evidenced by the effect of CEO fWHR as a determinant of market leverage in a subsample removed of post-turnover observations, which is consistent with results from the full sample. Results from Panel C indicate that testosterone levels may not play as important a role in the leverage choices of managers who go on to achieve longer tenures with their firms, as the relationship between CEO fWHR and leverage is positive but not statistically significant for this subsample. In general, it appears that higher testosterone levels may induce CEOs to pursue more aggressive leverage policies.
CEO fWHR and Cash Holdings:
The relationship between firm cash holdings and CEO fWHR is documented in Tables 4a   and 4b . If testosterone levels affect a CEO's decision of how much cash to hold, I expect that high-fWHR CEOs will have lower cash holdings than low-fWHR CEOs, since holding less cash would be considered a more risky financial policy. The results presented in Tables 4a and 4b are consistent with this hypothesis. Table 4a presents results of a univariate analysis of the relationship between firm cash holdings and CEO fWHR. In Panel A, high-fWHR CEOs are shown to hold less cash than low-fWHR CEOs. For both the cash-to-assets measure and when including short-term cash equivalents, the negative relationship between CEO fWHR and firm cash holdings is larger in magnitude for industry-adjusted measures. For industry-adjusted cashto-assets, the difference between high-fWHR and low-fWHR groups is -.0196, a decrease of 18.8% relative to the unconditional cash-to-assets mean. When including short term cash equivalents, the difference of -.0301 between high-and low-fWHR groups for the industry- Results of multivariate regressions of CEO fWHR on firm cash holdings are presented in Table 4b . The framework for these tests is similar to that used in multivariate tests for leverage in Tables 4a and 4b suggest that CEO testosterone levels play an important role in determining firm cash levels. The notion that the negative relationship between CEO fWHR and cash levels might be driven by managerial influence is supported by the observation that the relationship is stronger for more-influential CEOs.
CEO fWHR, Investment, and Profitability:
A univariate analysis of the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm investment is presented in Table 5a . If testosterone affects a CEO's investment decisions, I would expect to observe a positive relationship between CEO fWHR and firm investment, since higher investment would be considered more aggressive. However, I find no meaningful relationship between CEO fWHR and three forms of investment. Table 5a Table 5b presents the results of multivariate regressions analyzing the relationship between CEO fWHR and investment. All models contain industry and year fixed effects, as well as controls for firm size. In every model for each sample, the coefficients for CEO fWHR on investment are not statistically significant.
Overall, there is little evidence of a clear relationship between CEO fWHR and investment levels.
Though high-fWHR managers demonstrate, to some extent, more aggressive financial policies, it is unclear as to whether these policies might lead to better or worse financial performance. Results of univariate tests of the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm profitability is presented in Table 6a . Though high-fWHR CEOs demonstrate lower operating profitability than low-fWHR CEOs across all three subsamples, these differences are eliminated when considering industry-adjusted measures. Results of multivariate regressions of CEO fWHR on firm profitability, reported in Table 6b , indicate that there is not a clear relationship between CEO testosterone levels and firm profitability. All regressions in Table 6 include industry and year fixed effects, as well as controls for firm size. In all models, the coefficient for CEO fWHR is not statistically significant. These results, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the relationship between CEO fWHR and firm profitability outlined in Wong, Ormiston, and
Haselhuhn (2011), specifically that the effect of CEO fWHR on firm profitability differs depending on the cognitively complexity of leadership teams within organizations, as such inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, I find no overall relationship between CEO facial width and firm profitability, despite differences in some important financial policies.
Do Aggressive Firms Hire High-fWHR CEOs?
There are two possible explanations for the observed relationship between CEO fWHR and firm financial policies. One possibility is that high-fWHR CEOs have higher risk tolerance and therefore pursue riskier financial policies, such as higher leverage and lower cash holdings.
The fact that more aggressive financial policies are seen in firms managed by long-term CEOs, as well as when post-turnover observations are removed, provides some degree of evidence for the hypothesis that the observed financial policies are products of managerial influence and consistent with CEOs' preferences. The second possible explanation, though the two hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, is that firms with aggressive financial policies tend to select high-fWHR individuals when hiring new CEOs. These high-fWHR individuals should, on average, have higher risk tolerance and, as such, might be better fits for firms with already aggressive financial policies. If this is the case, the observed relationship between CEO fWHR and firm financial policies might be a product of CEO selection rather than managerial preferences.
The relationship between firm financial policies and facial width of subsequently-hired CEOs is investigated in Table 8 CEOs are hired to firms with somewhat higher leverage than firms that choose low-fWHR CEOs, the difference between groups is not statistically significant for any leverage measure.
Furthermore, all coefficients for correlation between CEO fWHR and pre-tenure firm leverage are not statistically significant. Although there may be instances where particularly highlyleverage firms hire high-fWHR CEOs, there is little evidence of a consistent relationship between CEO fWHR and pre-tenure leverage. Pre-hire cash holdings and investment levels appear to be mostly unrelated to the facial width of subsequently-hired CEOs, though the negative correlation between pre-tenure R&D expenditures and new CEO fWHR is statistically significant at the 5% level. Firms that hire high-fWHR CEOs tend to be somewhat more profitable than those that select low-fWHR CEOs, but none of the correlation statistics or differences in means relating CEO fWHR to pre-tenure profitability are statistically significant.
Overall, there does not appear to be a relationship between CEO fWHR and the preexisting financial characteristics of the firms that hire them. Although some kind of sorting effect cannot be ruled out completely since only CEOs hired after 2002 are included in these tests, I find more evidence that the observed relationships between CEO fWHR and firm financial policies are a result of managerial influence than of pre-existing differences financial characteristics between firms.
Conclusion
This paper is the first to document a relationship between CEO testosterone levels (proxied by facial width) and financial management decisions. Higher CEO facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) is associated with more aggressive financial policies. Specifically, I find a positive relationship between CEO fWHR and firm leverage and a negative relationship between CEO fWHR and firm cash holdings. These relationships are also observed among subsamples where
CEOs are likely to wield substantial influence over financial management policies, such as long- 
